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Abstract 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been seen as the manifestation of corporate citizenship or the 
contribution of corporations as part of society. As such, the initiatives and activities within the scope of 
CSR are often aimed at contributing to the society’s greater good. However, little has been discussed on 
the significance and implications of CSR activities in the context of plural, often conflicting, legal orders.  
This paper discusses a particular case when a CSR initiative overlaps with global private and national 
public regulations on sustainability. One of the most controversial issues in public and political debates 
on sustainability is the expansion of palm oil as a global commodity at the expense of forests in 
Indonesia. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and its standard launched in 2007 is a private 
multi-stakeholder regulation and was the only regulatory authority at both the global and national level to 
set rules for sustainable palm oil in palm oil producing countries. This changed when Indonesia, being the 
largest producer and exporter of palm oil, launched the mandatory Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil 
(ISPO) standard in 2011. Palm oil buyers generally demand compliance with the RSPO standard, while 
Indonesia insists that ISPO is the mandatory standard for palm oil producers in Indonesia. As a result, the 
regulatory system to govern sustainable palm oil in Indonesia has changed from a singular to a plural 
system. This plural legal order has become more diversified and complicated when in 2014 four very 
large palm oil companies committing themselves to zero deforestation production of palm oil through 
self-regulation and establishing the platform of the Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP). Self-regulation is 
seen as one of the ‘new’ forms of CSR (Auld et al. 2008). The companies’ self-regulation may overlap 
with the requirements of the RSPO and ISPO. At the same time, their self-regulation may also conflict 
with the national regulation on plantations, which stipulate that concession holders cannot leave their 
entitlements idle and must clear the land to plant the oil palm. 
We analyze the process through which the large palm oil companies promote zero-deforestation and 
navigate across different regulatory authorities and systems. For this purpose, we use the concept of 
interlegality (de Sousa-Santos 1987), that refers to interactions between different standards, norms, 
principles among different legal orders. We also use the concept of governance interactions (Eberlein et 
al. 2014) to explore whether and how interactions at the actor level can be characterized in terms of 
competition, cooperation, cooptation or chaos.  
The paper contributes to policy debate on CSR in plural legal order by reflecting on the inception of the 
Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP) and the interactions of IPOP with Indonesian public authorities, 
leading to the termination of IPOP. The paper concludes that good intentions of zero-deforestation and 
sustainability standards of private companies that are stricter than those of public authorities, are not 
necessarily well accepted by these authorities. On the contrary, collective organization of CSR may be 
considered a threat to public authorities, certainly when these authorities perceive the standards as 
influenced by foreign powers and not beneficial for smallholders.   
                                                          
1 All authors are affiliatied to the Public Administration and Policy Group of Wageningen University. Ahmad 
Dermawan is a PhD researcher, Otto Hospes is Associate Professor and Katrien Termeer is Professor. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been seen as the manifestation of corporate contribution to 
society. As such, the initiatives and activities within the scope of CSR are often aimed at contributing to 
the society’s greater good. Many existing studies refer to the drivers of CSR, both internally and 
externally. There are also studies on the effects of CSR on the financial performance and employee 
satisfaction. However, little has been discussed on the significance and implications of CSR activities in 
the context of plural, often conflicting, legal orders. 
This paper attempts to draw insights from a particular case when a CSR initiative overlaps or conflicts 
with global private and national public regulations on sustainability. One of the most controversial issues 
in public and political debates on sustainability is the expansion of palm oil as a global commodity at the 
expense of forests in Indonesia. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and its standard 
launched in 2007 is a private multi-stakeholder regulation and was the only regulatory authority at both 
the global and national level to set rules for sustainable palm oil in palm oil producing countries. This 
changed when Indonesia, being the largest producer and exporter of palm oil, launched the mandatory 
Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) standard in 2011. Palm oil buyers generally demand compliance 
with the RSPO standard, while Indonesia insists that ISPO is the mandatory standard for palm oil 
producers in Indonesia. As a result, the regulatory system to govern sustainable palm oil in Indonesia has 
changed from a singular to a plural system. 
This plural legal order has become more diversified and complicated when in September 2014 four very 
large palm oil companies committing themselves to zero deforestation production of palm oil through 
self-regulation and establishing the platform of the Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge (IPOP). Self-regulation is 
seen as one of the ‘new’ forms of CSR (Auld et al. 2008). The companies’ self-regulation may overlap 
with the requirements of the RSPO and ISPO. At the same time, they may also create tensions with 
existing sustainability standards and the actors regulating and implementing them. As IPOP was dissolved 
in July 2016, we aim to draw lessons on the interactions between the companies under IPOP and other 
actors and how they may change over time. For this purpose, we applied literature review and media and 
document analysis on the commitments under the IPOP, the interactions with other actors and its 
termination in less than two years after the signing in the New York Climate Summit in 2014. 
2. Theoretical framework 
Globalization of production and trade brings interconnectedness among actors in the production chain. 
Production of goods and services does not only involve actors along the value chain within a country, but 
also those outside the countries. Similarly, decisions made on a particular commodity affects actors in the 
value chain, both inside and outside the country. The production of goods and services creates economic, 
social and environmental impacts, both positively and negatively, and affecting the reputation of actors in 
the value chain. Reputation is what observers see about a particular company or industry in comparison 
with an ideal situation on how the particular industry should behave (Yue and Ingram 2012).  
For industries that have the same characteristics, the reputation can go beyond individual companies. This 
is very much the situation for oil palm in Indonesia. Poor practices of several individual companies 
resulted in poor reputation of the whole palm oil industry. This is what Yue and Ingram (2012) refer to as 
“reputation commons”. Companies in the industry are required to take collective efforts to rectify the 
industry reputation, and one of these efforts is to implement CSR. There are also signs that sustainability 
issues are better dealt with and increase the likelihoods of success by joining forces (Kiron et al. 2015). 
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Generally speaking, there are two different notions of CSR, each referring to a different driver of a 
company to take care of communities and engage with them. The first notion is that CSR is a form of 
charity and after-profit activity. The second notion refers to a wide array of attempts by companies to 
fully internalize social responsibility activities into the internal business process (Auld et al. 2008). In this 
context, self-regulation is seen as one of the many forms of the second version of CSR (Auld et al. 2008). 
Self-regulation may arise as a response of external pressures (Aguilera 2007, Godfrey et al. 2010), but can 
also evolve as a proactive corporate action and an attempt to control the market or the value chain 
(Dauvergne and Lister 2013).  
One characteristic of self-regulation is the voluntary nature: an individual company or a group of 
companies establish self-regulation without any orders from other actors to do so (Auld et al. 2008). The 
scope of self-regulation is not regulated by the state, which provides some flexibilities for the companies 
to set up their scope. Those who establish self-regulation face two main issues: the way and extent to 
which self-regulation can align with other existing regulatory systems (Short and Toffel 2010) and the 
way and extent to which design principles of self-regulation can be fulfilled (Termeer et al. 2013). The 
first issue deals with constraints on plural legal orders, and the other deals with establishing a well-
designed self-regulation. 
With the rise of self-regulation, next to global private and national public regulation, the palm oil sector 
can be characterized by global legal pluralism: the co-existence of different standards and regulatory 
systems across the globe. With different standards and regulatory systems co-exist, there are interactions 
both among different regulatory systems as well as among actors involved. These interactions among 
different regulatory systems can be described with the concept of interlegality (de Sousa-Santos 1987; 
Eberlein et al. 2014), that refers to interactions between different standards, norms, principles at the level 
of actors and regulatory systems.  
Eberlein et al. (2014) develop a framework on the transnational business governance interactions (TBGI). 
Transnational business regulation refers to “systematic efforts to regulate business conduct that involve a 
significant degree of non-state authority in the performance of regulatory functions across national 
borders” (Eberlein et al. 2014). The notion of transnational refers to the transnational character of actors 
that set and implement the regulation (Wood et al. 2015). Eberlein et al. (2014) refer to the notion of 
governance as regulatory governance, which is “organized and sustained attempts to change the behaviour 
of target actors to further a collective end, through rules or norms and means of implementation and 
enforcement”. Interaction refers to ways where actors react, anticipate and influence to one another (Wilts 
and Skippari 2007, Eberlein et al. 2014), or “mutual actions and responses of individuals, groups, 
institutions, structures or systems” (Wood et al. 2015). Eberlein et al. (2014) distinguish three levels of 
interaction. At the micro level, interactions take place between actors. The meso level is about 
interactions between different regulations or forms of regulatory governance within the same domain or 
issue field. Interactions at the macro level are interactions between regulations or forms of regulatory 
governance from different domains or issue fields.    
In the TBGI framework, Eberlein et al. (2014) elaborate six regulatory components that reflect the 
process from the genesis of regulation until its evaluation. These are: 1) framing the regulatory agenda 
and setting objectives; 2) formulating rules and norms; 3) implementing rules within targets; 4) gathering 
information and monitoring behaviour; 5) responding to non-compliance via sanctions and other forms of 
enforcement; and 6) evaluating policy and providing feedback, including the review of the rules. For each 
of the regulatory components, there are six important issues to take into account in analysing interactions. 
These are: 1) the actors who are interacting; 2) the drivers that shape interactions; 3) the mechanisms and 
pathways of interactions; 4) the character of interactions; 5) the effects of interactions, and 6) how 
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interactions change over time. These combination of the process of regulation and the issues can be 
visualized as a matrix with 36 cells (Eberlein et al. 2014 and Wood et al. 2015). 
In this paper, we focus our attention on the actors involved during the life of IPOP and key issues in the 
interaction between companies that joined the IPOP and other actors. In this regard, we look at different 
arguments that different actors have used during the interactions with IPOP members.  
3. The (hi)story of IPOP: from inception to termination  
The IPOP was not the first time or occasion that the big palm oil companies committed themselves to 
sustainable palm oil. Companies had already set up their own sustainability policies before signing the 
pledge. These sustainability policies have been the result of long interactions between these companies 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or nonprofit organizations. For example, Golden Agri 
Resource (GAR) established a ‘forest conservation policy’ in 2011. A few weeks before signing the 
pledge, this policy was updated (GAR 2014). The forest conservation policy was developed under 
consultation with the Tropical Forest Trust (TFT). Similarly, Wilmar set up its ‘no deforestation, no peat, 
no exploitation policy’ in December 2013 (Wilmar 2013) after consulting with the TFT (Johnson 2015). 
Cargill launched a ‘policy on sustainable palm oil’ in July 2014 (Cargill 2014). Asian Agri (AA) 
presented a ‘sustainability policy’ in its sustainability report of 2013-2014 (Asian Agri 2014).  
Although these companies have different names for their sustainability policy, their policies have a lot in 
common. They share policies about no expansion into areas with High Conservation Value (HCV) and 
High Carbon Stock (HCS). These companies also have policies that forbid the development of plantations 
on peatlands. Also, these companies also have policies to respect the Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
(FPIC) for local communities.  
One interesting issue with their sustainability policies is how these policies refer to the existing 
sustainability standards. On its forest conservation policy, GAR specifically mention the “compliance 
with all relevant laws and National Interpretation of RSPO Principles and Criteria” (GAR 2014). Cargill 
“endorses the … (RSPO) as the primary global sustainability standard…” (Cargill 2014). Wilmar also 
makes specific reference to RSPO in their policy on HCV areas (Wilmar 2013). This is different for AA: 
its sustainability policy document does not include an endorsement or reference to RSPO. Interestingly, 
except for GAR that mentions “all relevant laws”, no other company makes refers or endorses the ISPO, 
the national sustainability standard, let alone its endorsement.  
3.1 The rise of IPOP 
On September 24, 2014, during the Climate Change Summit, four big palm oil companies signed the 
IPOP. These companies were facilitated by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The signing 
was witnessed by the (then) Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The purpose of the pledge 
was to “find solutions for sustainable palm oil that is deforestation free, respects human and community 
rights and delivers shareholder value” (IPOP 2014).  
The pledge covers four main components. First, these companies pledge to improve environmental 
stewardship. Under this component, these companies would adopt and promote sustainable oil palm 
production practices. The adoption and promotion of sustainable production started from getting an 
agreement on acceptable scientific method to classify and identify forest areas with High Carbon Stock 
(HCS) and definition on the threshold that protects HCS forest, biodiversity and community and human 
rights. The companies also pledged that they would not develop new plantations on HCS areas based on 
the study that one of these companies had completed earlier (GAR and Greenpeace 2012). These 
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companies also pledged to adopt and promote sustainable supply chain management and procession. This 
is done by working with producers and consumers of palm oil to trace the origin of the supply. 
Second, these companies promised to collaborate with other stakeholders and to engage with the 
Government of Indonesia (GoI) to encourage the development of policies, legal and regulatory 
frameworks that promote the implementation of the pledge. These include four elements, such as a) the 
codification of all elements in the pledge within Indonesian laws; b) support the development and 
implementation of ISPO; c) support national and local regulatory reforms that improve spatial planning, 
encourage land swaps, incentivize forest conservation and promote the use of lands with lower carbon 
stock; and d) support the refinement and roll out of the One Map initiative.  
Third, the companies pledge to expand social benefits. These include the improvement of smallholder 
productivity through the provision of technical assistance to smallholders under partnership with these 
companies to improve yield and quality, and improvement of extension services to smallholders. To 
increase community participation in the oil palm production and processing, the companies pledged to 
facilitate the inclusion of smallholders into the supply chain, commitment to ensure the rights of 
communities are respected, and create jobs and employ local community members. Finally, these 
companies pledged to implement policies that empower communities, such as Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC) of indigenous people and local communities, responsible handling of complains and 
resolution of conflicts. 
Fourth, these companies pledged to increase the competitiveness of palm oil. Key activities under this 
part of the pledge include encouraging other palm oil companies to align with the pledge. The companies 
also wanted to raise awareness to increase the uptake of sustainable palm oil. Finally, these companies 
would carry out public relations activities to raise the image of Indonesian palm oil. 
The members of IPOP tried to persuade other companies to join the cause. In November 2014, the 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (ICC) co-organized a workshop that was aimed to build a common 
understanding about the oil palm supply chain and identified policies and best practices to halt 
deforestation. In this workshop, the ICC stated that ICC would accommodate the intentions of these 
companies in moving toward sustainable palm oil business, and encourage those against the pledge to 
also show positive contribution in the palm oil sector (IBCSD 2014). During the workshop, the 
representative of Wilmar mentioned that the driver of the company’s no-deforestation policy was the 
consumer power that demands sustainable palm oil. The representative of Cargill mentioned that 
deforestation and social welfare are the main issues in the palm oil supply chain (IBCSD 2014). One 
interesting remark by the representative of Cargill was the commitment from Cargill to only buy from 
sellers with a RSPO certificate and to make sure that all plasma holders abide to RSPO criteria (IBCSD 
2014). At the same time, however, the companies agreed that ISPO is the minimum certification that a 
palm oil can pursue. 
In December 2014, the ICC indicated that two more companies would join IPOP. At the same time, 
Musim Mas, another large palm oil company, issued its sustainability policy: ‘no deforestation, no 
peatland and no exploitation’. After the ICC formally invited Musim Mas to be part of the pledge, Musim 
Mas confirmed its intention to join the pledge on January 30, 2015. Musim Mas became the fifth 
company to join the IPOP on the letter signed in March 2015. In September 2015, IPOP management 
invited Astra Agro Lestari (AAL) to join IPOP. The invitation was delivered after AAL updated the 
sustainability policy to reflect the pledge of IPOP. AAL finally joined IPOP in February 2016.  
In August 2015, these companies set up IPOP management office. The management office was set up to 
assist IPOP members and ensure the implementation of the commitment. The management office also 
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facilitated the engagement process between IPOP members with the ICC and other actors, including the 
GoI, to implement the pledge. The management office set up its phased-approach programs toward 
achieving the pledge. In the first phase, which was planned to be completed in December 2016, the plan 
was to set up IPOP programs, develop strategic partnership, initiate key process of policy reforms, 
streamline the IPOP pledge into the GoI planning, and implement pilot programs. In the second phase, 
from January 2017 until December 2018, the key program was to upscale the pilot program. The third 
phase, from 2019 and beyond, the plan was to fully implement the four components of the pledge (Darus 
2015).  
According to its website (http://www.palmoilpledge.id/en) IPOP’s had three key programs: farmers’ 
empowerment, tenure reform and stakeholder engagement. The first program, farmers’ empowerment, 
was done mainly through collaboration with the Union of Oil Palm Farmers (Serikat Pekerja Kelapa 
Sawit – SPKS). The second program on tenure reform was mainly done through the encouragement to 
comply with ISPO as a compliant to the GoI provisions. Finally, stakeholder engagement was planned 
through active participation in multistakeholder processes. However, until its termination, most of the 
activities of IPOP management office was mainly on the third one, that is participation or organization of 
stakeholder engagements. Individual companies, however, might have done the other key programs, such 
as GAR’s activity to supply their plasma farmers with high quality seedlings and purchase their fresh fruit 
bunches (FFB), although it was not clear about what the companies did with the FFB from independent 
farmers. 
3.2 IPOP vis-à-vis RSPO and ISPO 
One of the questions raised with regard to the establishment of IPOP is about how IPOP differs and 
overlaps with two existing oil palm sustainability standards: RSPO and ISPO. Table 1 presents the RSPO 
and ISPO principles and compares them with IPOP. 
Table 1 shows that two IPOP components do not differ much with principles of RSPO and ISPO: 
improving environmental stewardship and expanding social benefits. the others. Two other components of 
IPOP are not part of the principles of the RSPO or ISPO: the improvement of competitiveness and 
strengthening policy and regulations. Especially the latter component one is remarkable. IPOP aspires to 
collaborate with the GoI to codify all elements of the pledge. However, it would be impossible for the GoI 
to codify something that has already been regulated. Moreover, some regulations are in contrast to what 
the pledge aspires. For instance, official regulations allow planting on peatland with the depth of not more 
than three meters (Law 5 of 1990). Also, strengthening policy and regulations is a bit confusing because 
of salient differences between RSPO and ISPO in three areas: the implementation of HCV demarcation 
on areas already allocated to plantations, the implementation of free prior and informed consent, and the 
procedures for new planting (Hospes 2014; Ministry of Agriculture and RSPO Secretariat 2016).  
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Table 1. RSPO and ISPO principles and criteria and IPOP 
 RSPO ISPO* IPOP 
1. Commitment to transparency   
2. Compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations 
Business Legality  Strengthen policy and 
regulations 
3. Commitment to long term 
economic and financial 
viability 
Estate management Improve competitiveness of 
Indonesian palm oil 
4. Use of appropriate best 
practices by growers and 
millers 
Protection on the utilization of 
primary natural forest and 
peatland 
 
5. Environmental responsibility 
and conservation of natural 
resources and biodiversity 
Environmental management 
and monitoring 
Improve environmental 
stewardship 
6. Responsible consideration of 
employees, and of individuals 
and communities affected by 
growers and mills 
- Responsibility to the 
workers  
- Social responsibility and 
community economic 
empowerment 
Expand social benefits 
7. Responsible development of 
new plantings 
Continuous business 
improvement  
 
8. Commitment to continuous 
improvement in key areas of 
activity 
  
Sources: RSPO (2013), The Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 11/Permentan/OT.140/3/2015, IPOP 
(2014) 
Note: *The principles are for integrated palm oil companies (estate+mill) 
 
3.3 Reactions of the Government of Indonesia 
Not long after IPOP management office was established in August 2015, the GoI expressed its 
disapproval of the IPOP. The representative of Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs (CMEA) 
viewed IPOP as a business-to-business initiative, that could put smallholders at risk. CMEA also 
reiterated the position that there is a mandatory sustainability standard for oil palm in Indonesia, that is 
ISPO. This view was also shared by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and the House of Representatives, 
which also stated that IPOP was a manifestation of the pressures from foreign countries, thus putting  
Indonesia’s sovereignty at risk (Said 2015; Sihombing 2015). Similarly, the representative of the Ministry 
of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) stated that IPOP overstepped the authority of government in terms 
of restricting land clearing for oil palm on areas that are permitted for clearing under the existing 
regulations (Jong 2015; Saturi 2015). These statements strongly contrasted with the statement made by 
the representative of the National Investment Board (NIB) that delivered a remark during the inauguration 
of the IPOP management. The NIB representative stated that IPOP could promote a palm oil business 
model that put emphasis on increasing productivity rather than opening up new areas (Wicaksono 2015). 
In October 2015, the GoI and the Government of Malaysia initiated the establishment of the Council of 
Palm Oil Producer Countries (CPOPC). The (then) Coordinating Minsiter of Maritime and Resource 
Affairs stated that this council would replace IPOP as IPOP was deemed as an infringement to the 
government authority. The Minister of Environment and Forestry also stated that the MoEF was 
reviewing all IPOP clauses that were too restrictive for Indonesian smallholders. At the same time, the 
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representative of the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) Indonesia viewed the GoI reaction as trying to 
eliminate obstacles to increase of palm oil production and areas. Similarly, the representative of SPKS 
also criticize the GoI for failing to empower smallholders (Gokkon 2015).  
However, when some reports showed that companies that do have a legal status, were not allowed to sell 
their FFB to IPOP members (under the rules and regime of the IPOP), resistance against the IPOP 
increased. This resistance intensified when the Indonesian Association of Oil Palm Smallholders  
(Asosiasi Petani Kelapa Sawit Indonesia - Apkasindo) also raised concerns (Listiyarini 2015; Hidayat 
2016). The MoA reiterated that the GoI, through the MoEF as the authority on environmental matters,  
would disband IPOP. The other issue that was used by the government against IPOP was related to laws 
to prevent monopoly of business. Allegedly, IPOP was to create a cartel, which is forbidden according to 
Indonesian Law 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of monopoly and unhealthy business competition practices 
(Hidayat 2016). In spite of this, officials of the MoA were aware that it would be difficult to disband 
IPOP as its establishment was ‘endorsed’ by the ex-President (Laoli 2016a).  
3.4 Termination of IPOP 
The IPOP management office claimed to have consulted with the Commission for the Supervision of 
Business Competition (CBCS). In October 2015, in its response to the IPOP, CBCS understood that IPOP 
was an agreement among private sector actors in the palm oil industry to implement the sustainable 
production of palm oil, and to improve the competitiveness of Indonesian palm oil in the global market. 
CBCS also notices that IPOP members enjoyed considerable economic or market power. At the same 
time, the CBCS stressed that Indonesia already has ISPO as mandatory sustainability standard. CBCS was 
aware that there is a significant difference between ISPO and IPOP, and that the introduction of the HCS 
concept was not in line with ISPO. CBCS also consulted with the MoA and the Coordinating Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, and mentioned that IPOP can be seen a business-to-business initiative as long as it 
does not violate the regulation. However, CBCS (2015) also mentioned that IPOP was difficult to 
implement as some of the pledges were not in line with the existing regulation.  
The position of the CBCS was not made public, until it finally emerged in April 2016 as a press release 
on the CBCS website (CBCS 2016). The additional point that was raised by the CBCS was that IPOP 
could become a barrier to entry to be used by IPOP members against other actors. The GoI found that this 
could be used as the basis to disband IPOP (Laoli 2016b). At this point, the IPOP management challenged 
the CBCS opinion and requested a more intensive dialogue. IPOP also claimed to have implemented the 
recommendations of the CBCS in its October 2015 letter (Laoli 2016c). 
While the CBCS was still investigating if IPOP was a cartel, the head of the office stated that each of 
these companies would receive hefty penalties if they were proven to violate the Law 5 of 1999. The 
penalties was around IDR 125 billion (approximately USD 9.6 million). The CBCS had also sent the 
letter to the President and other relevant government agencies recommending that IPOP should be 
disbanded (Jati 2016). On June 30, 2016, IPOP was officially dissolved (IPOP 2016).  
4. Discussion  
Using the framework of the TBGI of Eberlein et al (2014), the rise and fall of IPOP provides a number of 
interesting observations. We highlight some of them and discuss what they mean in terms of CSR. 
4.1 Interactions between different institutional actors in the palm oil industry 
The interaction at the micro (actor) level shows that prior to the signing of IPOP, the companies acted  
individually in developing a corporate sustainability policy. This development was mainly a result of 
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intensive collaboration between each of these companies and several NGOs (e.g. Johnson 2015). When 
these companies joined forces to sign IPOP with the facilitation of the ICC, the ICC took the lead in the 
engagement of the cause with the other stakeholders, mainly with the relevant agencies within the GoI. 
After the IPOP management was established, the IPOP management was at the forefront in representing 
the interest of IPOP in negotiating the program with the GoI as well as in the stakeholder engagements. 
Most of the media coverage highlighted the contract between what IPOP has been promoted and the GoI 
position on the case. 
It is interesting to highlight the position of the GoI as the IPOP developed. Prior to the signing, the GoI 
generally had two positions. First, Indonesia has ISPO as the mandatory standard for sustainable palm oil. 
Two, RSPO is seen as voluntary, and is accepted to co-exist as long as it does not interfere with the ISPO. 
This position remained the same even after these companies signed the New York pledge. However, the 
GoI started to clearly say its disagreement and challenge to IPOP after IPOP established a management 
office in August 2015 and started its programs. Individual companies may have market power, but when 
these companies that collectively control a significant portion of the market joined forces, the GoI started 
to see IPOP has posing the risk to the actors that the GoI protects mostly, that is the smallholders. The 
GoI put forward several arguments to halt the implementation of IPOP. 
4.2 Interactions at meso-level between different regulatory systems in the palm oil sector  
At the meso level, the tension between RSPO as the global voluntary sustainable palm oil standard and 
ISPO as the mandatory standard for Indonesia has been there since ISPO was established in 2011 (Hospes 
2014). A joint study on ISPO and RSPO found that both standards have different views on two key issues 
(Ministry of Agriculture and RSPO Secretariat). In the beginning, the main argument of the GoI was that 
Indonesia has an official standard (ISPO) and there is no need to have IPOP. As the IPOP engagement 
intensifies, the other arguments that came about were: 1) IPOP oversteps the GoI authority; 2) IPOP 
comes as the pressure from the western world; 3) IPOP can put Indonesia’s sovereignty in danger; 4) 
IPOP can have adverse impact on smallholders.  
4.3 Interactions at macro-level: palm oil sector and the Indonesian economy  
The critical interactions that finally ended the life of IPOP were staged by the CBCS findings that IPOP 
could harm the business environment by potentially creating cartel has turned the direction of ISPO 
toward its dissolution. Although IPOP has been persuading the GoI that the pledge would aim for greater 
good and would not harm the Indonesian economy, the potential collusion and some of the early impacts 
of the pledge have intensified the GoI plan to disband IPOP. Adding this pressure with the considerable 
amount of penalties that could be imposed to each of the IPOP had they been found violating the 
antimonopoly law, IPOP has finally been dissolved. At the time of writing (September 2016), it has not 
been clear whether CBCS has decided that IPOP members should pay the penalties. 
5. Conclusion 
In a complex and plural legal order, launching and implementing CSR in the form of new rules of the 
game for contributing to sustainable business and development, is a very difficult undertaking. Joining 
forces is not a guarantee for sustainability achievement (cf. Kiron et al. 2015): without government buy-
in, collective action of big companies to organize CSR can easily fail. The increasing resistance of the 
GoI to the IPOP after it established a management office, highlighted that the group, especially with its 
significant economic power, could pose the government at risk of losing control.  
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The rise and demise of IPOP shows that good intentions and higher sustainability standards of private 
companies are not necessarily well accepted by public authorities. On the contrary, corporate collective 
action and high sustainability standards may be considered a threat to public authorities, when these 
authorities perceive the standards as influenced by foreign powers and not beneficial for smallholders.   
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